

**CONFERENCE OF THE EIGHTEEN-NATION COMMITTEE
ON DISARMAMENT**

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FINAL VERBATIM RECORD OF THE ONE HUNDRED AND SIXTIETH MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Tuesday, 28 January 1964, at 10.30 a.m.

Chairman:

Mr. R.K.NEHRU

(India)

PRESENT AT THE TABLE

Brazil:

Mr. J. de CASTRO

Mr. E. HOSANNAH

Bulgaria:

Mr. K. LUKANOV

Mr. G. GUELEV

Mr. D. TEHOV

Mr. G. YANKOV

Burma:

Mr. James BARRINGTON

U SAIN BWA

U MAUNG MAUNG GYI

U HTOON SHEIN

Canada:

Mr. E.L.M. BURNS

Mr. A.E. GOTLIEB

Mr. R.M. TAIT

Czechoslovakia:

Mr. L. SIMOVIC

Mr. M. ZEMLA

Mr. T. LAHODA

Mr. V. VAJNAR

Ethiopia:

Ato Abate AGEDE

Ato S. TEFERRA

India:

Mr. R.K. NEHRU

Mr. A.S. MEHTA

Mr. K. KRISHNA RAO

Mr. K. NARENDRA NATH

Italy:

Mr. F. CAVALLETTI

Mr. E. GUIDOTTI

Mr. S. AVETTA

Mr. G.P. TOZZOLI

PRESENT AT THE TABLE (Cont'd)

Mexico:

Mr. Ernesto de SANTIAGO
Mr. Manuel TELLO
Miss Ofelia REYES-RETANA

Nigeria:

Mr. L.C.N. OBI

Poland:

Mr. M. NASZKOWSKI
Mr. M. BLUSZTAJN
Mr. E. STANIEWSKI
Mr. J. GOLDBLAT

Romania:

Mr. V. DUMITRESCU
Mr. E. GLASER
Mr. N. ECOBESCU
Mr. Mihai IONESCU

Sweden:

Mrs. A. MYRDAL
Mr. P. HAMMARSKJOLD
Mr. C.G. EKLUND
Mr. J. PRAWITZ

Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics:

Mr. S.K. TSARAPKIN
Mr. A.A. ROSHCHIN
Mr. I.G. USACHEV
Mr. V.V. SHUSTOV

United Arab Republic:

Mr. H. ISMAIL
Mr. AHMED OSMAN
Mr. M. KASSEM
Mr. S.E. IBRAHIM

PRESENT AT THE TABLE (Cont'd)

United Kingdom:

Mr. Peter THOMAS
Sir Paul MASON
Mr. J.G. TAHOUDIN
Mr. J.M. EDES

United States of America:

Mr. W.C. FOSTER
Mr. A.L. RICHARDS
Mr. D.S. MACDONALD
Mr. R.A. MARTIN

Special Representative of the
Secretary-General:

Mr. D. PROTITCH

Deputy Special Representative
of the Secretary-General:

Mr. W. EPSTEIN

The CHAIRMAN (India): I declare open the one hundred and sixtieth meeting of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament.

Mr. TSARAPKIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translation from Russian): First of all, I should like to express my gratitude to the representatives of Burma, Sweden and the United States who have kindly made it possible for me to speak first at today's meeting. I will now turn to the substance of the matter.

On the instructions of the Soviet Government, the Soviet delegation is today submitting for the Committee's consideration the following "Memorandum of the Government of the USSR on measures for slowing down the armaments race and relaxing international tension":

"As a result of the joint efforts of all men of good will, it has been possible to achieve a certain relaxation of international tension; this has been reflected in the conclusion of a treaty on the prohibition of nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water and in an agreement not to place in orbit objects carrying nuclear weapons.

"The Soviet Government considers that more favourable conditions have now been created for agreeing upon and carrying out other measures aimed at a further relaxation of international tension. If the efforts of all governments and peoples are united in the cause of peace, 1964 may become a turning point towards an improvement in the whole international situation.

"The Soviet Government, which considers that the main task of governments is to achieve the speediest possible agreement on general and complete disarmament, at the same time proposes that agreement be reached on the implementation of measures aimed at slowing down the armaments race and further lessening international tension.

1. Withdrawal of foreign troops from the territories of other countries

"The question of the withdrawal of foreign troops stationed in the territories of other countries to within the boundaries to their national territories is now acquiring particular importance and urgency.

"The presence of foreign troops in the territories of other countries is one of the principal sources of international tension and gives rise to conflicts fraught with danger to the cause of the peace and the security of the peoples. As recent events in various parts of the world have shown, the

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withdrawal of foreign troops from the territories of other countries is becoming increasingly imperative and urgent. Of particularly important significance would be the withdrawal of foreign troops from the territories of European States, where the troops and armaments of the NATO countries, on the one hand, and of the Warsaw Treaty countries, on the other, are concentrated in large numbers.

"Agreement on the withdrawal of foreign troops would not cause detriment to either side, since this would not disrupt the general balance of forces between the States belonging to the two groups, namely NATO and the Warsaw Treaty. After all, the military leaders of the NATO countries themselves, to judge by their statements, take as their starting point the assumption that the total number of NATO forces is not less, but is even greater than the number of troops of the Warsaw Treaty countries.

"The Soviet Union proposes the most radical way of solving this question, namely, that all foreign troops should be withdrawn from all foreign territories and that not a single foreign soldier should be left anywhere, in any part of the world. On its part, the Soviet Union is prepared to withdraw all its troops from the territories of foreign States where they are now stationed, if the Western Powers will do likewise. If, however, the Western Powers are not as yet prepared for such a radical solution of this important question, the Soviet Government proposes that agreement be reached immediately that the number of armed forces in foreign territories should first be reduced on a basis of reciprocity, and afterwards it will be possible to lead up gradually, step by step, to their complete withdrawal to within the boundaries of their national territories. The Soviet Union is prepared to set about such a reduction of its troops in the territory of the German Democratic Republic and other European States, if the Western Powers begin to reduce the number of their troops in the Federal Republic of Germany and other countries.

"The implementation of these measures would undoubtedly lead to the normalization of the situation in Europe and would thereby contribute to the strengthening of universal peace.

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2. Reduction of the total numbers of the armed forces of States

"The Soviet Government has always declared itself in favour of the reduction of the armed forces of States, and the Soviet Union has on a number of occasions undertaken a considerable reduction of its army even unilaterally. At the present time, more favourable possibilities have come about for settling this important question on a reciprocal basis, without waiting for the implementation of the programme of general and complete disarmament to begin.

"As Mr. N.S. Khrushchev, the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, has stated, the Soviet Union has now set about further reducing the number of its armed forces. The Soviet Government is prepared to go in the direction of reducing the numbers of its armed forces still further, if the governments of the Western Powers show willingness to take similar measures.

3. Reduction of military budgets

"Being anxious to put an end to the unbridled growth of military expenditure which is a heavy burden on the shoulders of the peoples, the Soviet Government has on a number of occasions made proposals for the reduction of military budgets. As is well known, the Soviet Union has recently shown initiative in solving this question by unilaterally reducing its military budget for 1964 by 600 million roubles. It is also known that the United States Government in its turn is taking measures for a certain reduction of its military expenditure. Thus there now exist favourable pre-conditions for agreement on a further reciprocal reduction of military budgets. The Soviet Government proposes that agreement be reached to reduce the military budgets of States by 10 to 15 per cent.

4. Conclusion of a non-aggression pact between the NATO and the Warsaw Treaty countries

"The Soviet Government considers it essential to agree to conclude a non-aggression pact between the States parties to the Warsaw Treaty and the States members of NATO. The conclusion of such a pact would in no way disrupt the existing balance of forces between the two groups and, at the same time, would introduce into international relations the element of stability and calm which is so much needed.

"In the years which have elapsed since the Soviet Government first put forward a proposal for the conclusion of such a pact, this idea has met with

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the support of statesmen and public figures in many countries. The time has come to discuss this proposal in a businesslike way and to arrive at a mutually acceptable agreement. Moreover, this is called for by the commitments laid down in the joint communiqué of the USSR, the United States and the United Kingdom of 25 July 1963. The Soviet Government reaffirms its willingness to conclude a non-aggression pact with the States members of NATO.

"With regard to the form that the non-aggression pact should take, the Soviet Government considers that this question can be solved without any particular difficulty.

5. Establishment of denuclearized zones

"The Soviet Government attaches great importance to the establishment of denuclearized zones in various parts of the world. This idea has met with universal response and approval during recent years. Proposals have been put forward for the establishment of denuclearized zones in Central and Northern Europe, in the Mediterranean, in the Balkans, in Africa and Latin America, as well as in other regions of the world.

"In supporting the plans for the establishment of denuclearized zones in various regions of the world, the Soviet Government attaches special importance to the formation of such zones in those regions where the danger of nuclear conflict is greatest, and first and foremost in Central Europe.

"The Soviet Government, on its part, will be prepared to give an undertaking to respect the status of denuclearized zones wherever and whenever they are established.

6. Prevention of the further spread of nuclear weapons

"As the stocks of nuclear weapons increase, and the methods of manufacturing them are improved, and as ever new types of such weapons are being devised, the question of preventing their further dissemination becomes increasingly important. A widening of the circle of States possessing nuclear weapons would increase many times over the danger of the outbreak of a thermonuclear war. At the same time a widening of the circle of nuclear States would also make it much more difficult to solve the problem of disarmament.

"The Soviet Government notes that at present there is an increasing awareness throughout the world of the danger threatening mankind in connexion with the further spread of nuclear weapons. It is the duty of all governments

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to make every effort to avert this danger before it is too late. It is particularly important from the point of view of the interests of peace to close all the channels, whether direct or indirect, through which nuclear weapons could come into the hands of those who twice during this century have caused the conflagration of a world war and who are now actively striving to obtain nuclear weapons.

"In order to shut off all possibilities for the spread of nuclear weapons, the Soviet Government proposes that an agreement on this question should contain, besides the prohibition to transfer such weapons or to give information on their manufacture to any particular government, also provisions to guarantee that such a transfer of nuclear weapons or access to them shall not take place indirectly, through military blocs, for example, through the so-called multi-lateral nuclear force of NATO.

7. Measures to prevent surprise attack

"The Soviet Government has declared itself and continues to declare itself in favour of taking active and effective measures to prevent surprise attack. As is well known, for this purpose the Soviet Union put forward a proposal for the establishment of a network of observation posts in the territories of the countries belonging to the two opposing groups of States in conjunction with certain measures for lessening international tension such as a reduction in the numbers of foreign troops in the territories of European countries and an undertaking not to station nuclear weapons in the German Democratic Republic and the Federal Republic of Germany.

"The Soviet Government considers that, if unaccompanied by these concrete measures for the lessening of international tension and the limitation of armaments, the establishment of observation posts could not lead to the achievement of the desired aim, namely, the growth of confidence between States, and thereby a lessening of the danger of war. On the contrary, it might even lead to an increase of mutual suspicions and to the aggravation of international relations.

"The establishment of a system of observation posts may prove to be useful only in conjunction with concrete measures for reducing the threat of war. Practical steps for a real lessening of the possibility of an outbreak of military conflict in Europe and observation posts would in that case be two complementary aspects of a single process -- the lessening of tension in the danger zones where the armed forces of the two opposing groups face each other.

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8. Elimination of bomber aircraft

"Bomber aircraft, though obsolete, still remain one of the powerful means of carrying on a war of aggression, used to deliver nuclear weapons many thousands of kilometres from their bases in order to inflict massive blows in the territories of other States. The elimination of this type of armament would diminish the risk of war and help to strengthen the security of all peoples. The Soviet Government is prepared to examine this question.

9. Prohibition of underground nuclear tests

"The Soviet Government declares its readiness, as before, to reach agreement on extending the treaty banning nuclear weapons tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water, to underground testing.

"Actual experience has fully confirmed that no special international control need be organized to detect underground tests any more than it is needed to detect tests in the atmosphere, outer space, and under water.

* * *

"The Soviet Government assumes, of course, that in concluding agreements providing for measures of actual disarmament, agreement must be achieved on appropriate, mutually acceptable forms of control over the implementation of these measures.

"In the opinion of the Soviet Government, the implementation of the measures enumerated in this Memorandum would lead to a further considerable lessening of international tension and would constitute an important step forward towards solving the main problem -- general and complete disarmament."

I have just read out to you the text of the memorandum of the Soviet Government. The Soviet delegation requests the Secretariat to issue the text of this memorandum as an official document of the Eighteen-Nation Conference on Disarmament.^{1/}

We sincerely hope that the delegations represented in the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament will actively support the proposals set forth in the memorandum of the Soviet Government, proposals which are aimed at reducing the danger of war and at relaxing international tension, and that all of us together will soon be able to arrive at mutually-acceptable agreements.

^{1/} Circulated as document ENDC/123.

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The proposals contained in the memorandum differ in their character. Some of them can be directly related to disarmament measures, while others are aimed at bringing about more favourable conditions that would facilitate disarmament.

In putting forward the proposals contained in the memorandum, the Soviet Government has taken into account the sentiments which were so clearly manifested at the last session of the General Assembly. All the proposals set forth in this memorandum are linked together by a single common trend -- the desire to reduce the danger of war and to begin the task of disarmament.

In submitting for the Committee's consideration the memorandum of the Government of the Soviet Union on measures for slowing down the armaments race and relaxing international tension, the Soviet delegation would like to make a few comments on some of the questions mentioned in it.

The memorandum points out that of particularly important significance would be the withdrawal of foreign troops from the territories of European States, where the troops and armaments of the two powerful military groups confronting each other in Europe -- the NATO countries, on the one hand, and the Warsaw Treaty countries on the other -- are concentrated in large numbers.

This is not accidental. Twice in this century Europe has been the focus of the outbreak of destructive world wars. And now its territory has **again** become a sort of powder-magazine where more inflammable material has been accumulated than in any other area of the world. The territory of Europe has been turned into the place of concentration, absolutely abnormal in peace-time, of the armed forces and military equipment of the States belonging to the two military groups confronting each other. Here a world conflagration could be easily sparked off.

In striving to avert that threat, the Soviet Union has repeatedly proposed during the last ten years that an agreement be reached on the withdrawal or reduction of foreign troops in Europe. As far back as 1957 Mr. Khrushchev pointed out that "this would be very useful and would constitute the first **step** for testing good relations and establishing a good atmosphere that would not smell of war".

Formerly the Western Powers referred to considerations of military necessity as a justification for stationing foreign troops in the territory of West Germany. In doing so, they pointed to the Soviet Union's superiority in armed forces and to the length of the lines of communications between America and Europe. But years have gone by since then. Both those arguments have become obsolete and no longer

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even figure in the battery of arguments of the NATO strategists. Military techniques have been improved. They have radically changed the means of waging war and have made the maintenance of foreign troops in Europe unjustified even from the point of view of the military leaders of the United States of America.

The maintenance of foreign troops in the territories of European States creates an atmosphere fraught with war and prevents the normalization of the situation in this area and the establishment of confidence in relations between States. The sooner foreign troops are withdrawn from the territories of European countries or, at least, in the first stage substantially reduced, the lesser will be the danger of an outbreak of war, and the way will be cleared for strengthening peace and the security of peoples not only in Europe but throughout the world.

The particular importance and urgency of the question of withdrawing foreign troops stationed in the territories of other countries to within their own national boundaries is quite obvious. Recent events in various parts of the world are an eloquent confirmation of this. Here is a list of bare facts of recent times, which tell of foreign troops intervening in the internal affairs of other States and which testify to the role of foreign troops as a weapon, as an instrument for suppressing national-liberation movements. The desire of the Republic of Cyprus to free itself from foreign control gave rise to sanguinary events on the island and direct intervention by foreign troops in the internal affairs of the Republic of Cyprus; foreign troops shot at demonstrations of the civilian population in Panama; foreign troops are intervening in the internal affairs of recently-independent African States: Tanganyika, Kenya, Uganda and Zanzibar; Portuguese troops are brutally exterminating the native population of Angola, which is fighting for liberation from the colonial yoke. For many years there have been unceasing attempts by means of foreign armed intervention to prevent liberation movements in Aden and in other places of the Arabian peninsula. The same is to be seen in northern Kalimantan, in Borneo. For many years foreign troops have been occupying South Korea. Foreign military intervention still continues in South Viet-Nam. There are many other facts which could be cited in this connexion and which point to a most dangerous development of events in various parts of the world caused by the presence of foreign troops.

The question of the withdrawal of foreign troops from the territories of other countries to within their own national boundaries is becoming increasingly acute and urgent. It should be solved without delay. The Soviet delegation hopes that the Committee will express itself decisively in support of this proposal of the Soviet Union.

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I should also like to dwell briefly on the question of a non-aggression pact between the NATO countries and the States belonging to the Warsaw Treaty Organization. We note with satisfaction that the proposal (ENDC/75) to conclude a non-aggression pact between the countries of NATO and the countries of the Warsaw Treaty Organization is meeting with ever wider support throughout the world. In the broad circles of public opinion throughout the world more and more voices are heard resolutely advocating the conclusion of a pact, while responsible political leaders in government circles in the countries of Europe, Asia, Africa and America also speak in support of this proposal. This is also evident from the statements of the majority of members of our Committee. Besides the socialist countries, the delegations of India, Nigeria, the United Arab Republic, Mexico, Brazil and a number of others have supported a non-aggression pact.

I should like to recall that the representative of Nigeria, Mr. Obi, stated at the meeting of the Committee held on 1 August 1963:

"My delegation has long since declared itself in favour, among other things, of a mutually-negotiated non-aggression pact between the two giant military groupings of NATO and the Warsaw Treaty ..." (ENDC/PV.149, p.9)

The representative of India, Mr. Mehta, stated on behalf of his delegation at the meeting of the Committee held on 29 August 1963:

"We have already indicated that non-aggression pacts are to be welcomed wherever they can be applied because they help to lessen the danger of war and promote a peaceful and tolerant atmosphere." (ENDC/PV.156, p.15)

Moreover, the representative of India pointed out particularly that a favourable consideration of the question of a non-aggression pact between the NATO countries and the Warsaw Treaty countries is aided by the flexible attitude of the Soviet Union in regard to the form of such an international agreement.

Many responsible statesmen of the Western Powers also quite definitely declare themselves in favour of the proposal for the conclusion of a non-aggression pact between the NATO countries and the States belonging to the Warsaw Treaty Organization. As examples, we may cite the statements made by the Ministers for Foreign Affairs: Mr. Spaak of Belgium, Mr. Butler of the United Kingdom, Mr. Saragat of Italy, and others. It is true that some politicians, for whom the conclusion of a non-aggression pact would be not to their liking, use the argument that there is no need for a non-aggression pact between the NATO and the Warsaw Treaty countries,

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since those States had already assumed such an obligation under the United Nations Charter. It seems to us that in these days that argument sounds unconvincing. It is well known that the United Nations Charter entered into force eighteen years ago; but see how many military conflicts, clashes and even wars there have been in the world since then! And all this happened in spite of the fact that the States Members of the United Nations had assumed the obligation to refrain, in their relations with each other, from the threat or use of force, and to settle all disputes between them by peaceful means alone.

In view of these circumstances, the reference to the obligations assumed by States under the United Nations Charter as an argument which, it is alleged, makes the conclusion of a non-aggression pact unnecessary, sounds completely unconvincing. On the contrary, the conclusion of such a specific treaty as a non-aggression pact between the NATO countries and the States belonging to the Warsaw Treaty Organization would be a serious obligation assumed before the whole world by the States belonging to those two organizations. We are convinced that such a pact, while it would not completely eliminate the danger of a nuclear missile war breaking out, would reduce that danger to a considerable extent.

The increasing support throughout the world for the proposal to conclude a non-aggression pact between the NATO countries and the Warsaw Treaty countries emphasizes the urgency of such a pact and the great international importance which its conclusion would have. Delay and procrastination in settling this question are inadmissible and cannot be justified. We can say so with all the more reason, as three great Powers -- the USSR, the USA and the United Kingdom -- according to the Moscow communiqué of 25 July 1963 (ENDC/101) undertook to continue discussions for the purpose of concluding a non-aggression pact. The people expect the Governments of those countries to carry out consistently and without further delay the obligations they have assumed.

Now a few words on the proposal, contained in the memorandum, concerning the elimination of bomber aircraft. This proposal is intended to meet the clearly expressed will of the peoples demanding that governments should start taking practical steps in the field of disarmament. This proposal fully corresponds to the idea of the physical destruction of armaments. It was precisely this idea which the Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, Mr. Khrushchev, had in mind when, in

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his concluding speech at the Plenum of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union on 13 December 1963, he said: "The main thing is to embark on the road of real, or, as it is called, physical disarmament and to follow that road to the end."

It is to be assumed that the President of the United States, Mr. Johnson, meant the same thing when he pointed out in his message to the Eighteen-Nation Committee that:

"... the best way to begin disarming is to begin ..." (ENDC/120, p.2)

It seems that, without fear of falling into exaggeration or error, we can draw the conclusion that there is a positive attitude in the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada and many other countries, towards the idea of the physical destruction of armaments. In this connexion I should like to remind the Committee that a week ago the representative of the United Kingdom, Mr. Thomas, appealed to all members of the Committee -- including himself, it is to be assumed -- to

"... get away from too much general debate and ... concentrate instead on fundamental problems ..." (ENDC/PV.157, p.23)

which, as he quite rightly said, include "above all, nuclear disarmament in all its aspects". Moreover, Mr. Thomas urged us to devote a good deal of our attention to the destruction of nuclear delivery vehicles, as one of the very important aspects of disarmament. The United Kingdom representative suggested in fairly definite terms that we start with the physical destruction of weapons, which, as he put it:

"... would be a real demonstration of our determination to turn the rising graph of armaments downwards". (ibid.)

Those were, of course, good, encouraging words which we are happy to point out here. In this regard Mr. Thomas was supported by the representative of Canada, Mr. Burns, who also suggested that we should make a start with the physical destruction of weapons and explained that he had in mind particularly nuclear weapon vehicles (ENDC/PV.158, p.11).

The implementation of such a measure as the destruction of bomber aircraft -- which, although obsolete, still remain one of the powerful means of carrying on a war of aggression, being intended for the delivery of massive blows in the territories of other States -- would reduce the threat of war, would help to strengthen the security of all peoples, and would be a substantial contribution to the task of physical disarmament, in favour of which many delegations have spoken here.

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We hope that this new Soviet proposal will meet with the unanimous support of all members of the Committee.

There can be no doubt that the achievement of agreement on the proposals contained in the Soviet Government's memorandum would lead to creating in the world a new situation, more favourable to the implementation of general and complete disarmament, and 1964 could become the year of a decisive change for the better in the entire international atmosphere.

In concluding my statement, I should like to say a few words on another question. The Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, Mr. Khrushchev, in his message of 31 December 1963 to the Heads of States and governments, put forward a problem of paramount international importance, namely, the renunciation by States of the use of force for the settlement of territorial disputes and boundary questions. The achievement of agreement on this issue would contribute considerably to the improvement of international life and, at the same time, to the achievement of agreement on disarmament questions.

There has been expressed in the Committee the desire to exchange views on this message of Mr. Khrushchev. Obviously the Soviet delegation is quite ready to participate in such a discussion.

Mrs. MYRDAL (Sweden): The statement we have just heard from the Soviet representative is obviously of great importance to this Conference, but it will require a great deal of home-work on our part, and so it is not possible for me to comment on it now.

The Swedish delegation has studied with careful attention the statements already made by most delegations in the first round of exchanges of views at this ~~new~~ session of our Conference, and my first task today is to join them in the welcome extended to our new colleagues.

I also wish to express our deep satisfaction that there has been such unanimity among delegations concerning the good auspices under which our work begins. Of course, the smaller the difficulties and divergences ahead of us, the less important may also seem to be the role of the smaller countries. I for one do not look upon the situation in that way but feel rather that, the more promising the prospects of our disarmament negotiations appear, the more will suggestions and recommendations

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have to be spelt out in concrete detail. Hence more work will be required also of those of us which are not great Powers but which, after all, have the same stake in increased security and peace.

There should be no doubt in the mind of anybody that this Conference faces a challenge. However we judge the results of our previous labours --- whether we take pride in the fact that preparatory deliberations in our Committee were of value in leading to the achievement of the partial test ban, or whether we entertain regrets that all agreements have not been reached and announced in this hall -- a singular challenge now stands before us: to be able to report very shortly on some tangible result by elaborating at least one measure or other which would be a concrete step leading us further on the road to disarmament. Let us be aware that, if such steps are not taken during this session, we may lose the impetus which now moves our strivings.

In order to meet this challenge, we have not only to muster high courage but also to do some hard work. Like other delegations, the Swedish delegation wishes to see such joint work proceed more effectively not only at formal conference meetings but also between them. We are ready to join the United Kingdom, Canada and other delegations in suggesting to our co-Chairmen that ad hoc working parties should be set up at a suitable juncture in our work for probing more deeply into problems of detail and technicalities. Our emphasis is on the following two practical points: (a) multiplying the effective work hours, and (b) securing opportunities for intensive discussion of details. There would certainly be no need to take an over-all decision concerning the form such groups should take; they should be shaped according to ad hoc requirements.

To begin with, this means that we are not at all troubled by questions about the status of such groups --- whether or not they are composed of experts expressly called in. In order to get the maximum of useful work out of such groups and in order, I must confess, to satisfy the reservations against such working methods held by some of our colleagues, I would suggest that such working sessions should be as informal as possible --- for instance, without a record being taken. I take it that this is what was envisaged by the United Kingdom representative, Mr. Thomas, when he referred to private discussions in his statement at our meeting on 21 January (ENDC/PV.157, p.24). The groups need not even report as groups to our Conference. They might, of course, establish a joint working paper or summarize a set of recommendations if a topic seemed to be best treated that way.

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We should deem such groups useful even if they were only constituted informally as ad hoc meetings between certain members of our delegations, already present or specially co-opted, possessing expert knowledge in a specific field, and even if these members reported back only to their own delegations for whatever use they might wish to make of the additional knowledge gained by such a more intensive exchange of views. My delegation expressed its attitude on this question in the First Committee of the United Nations on 30 October 1963, when we said:

"... it might be sufficient to encourage members of the Disarmament Committee to add more technical ... and scientific experts "to their delegations, possibly on a short-term basis, and to arrange for mutual consultations between them in Geneva." (A/C.1/PV.1321, p.61)

It goes without saying that, if more formal working parties were set up, that also would meet with our approval. However, I have gone to some length to indicate our willingness to co-operate under informal conditions also.

The decisive criterion of the value of such working groups is whether they can truly restrict themselves to an exchange of views on technical aspects of one or other of our problems while reserving the political aspects for debate in this Committee. I believe it helped us to take a forward-looking view of this working method when the Czechoslovak representative, Mr. Simovic, made it an explicit condition that questions of principle and policies relating to each issue should first be debated by this Committee, which should always remain their proper domain (ENDC/PV.158, p.17). This Committee should formulate the specific terms of the questions which might at a certain stage be referred for more technical discussion within an ad hoc group. Thereafter this Committee should again deliberate freely and weigh the findings or arguments of the panel group from a political vantage point, without commitments ever being permitted to be made by members of the sub-groups.

That is the very prudent pattern I visualized in trying to use as test cases the proposals for collateral disarmament measures recently submitted for discussion in the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament. As an example, let us take the suggestion, recently high-lighted by President Johnson, that all transfers of nuclear fissionable materials for peaceful purposes take place under effective

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international safeguards (ENDC/120, p.2). It would then seem indispensable that this Committee should first discuss the political acceptability of such a proposal, and even reach agreement in principle -- to follow Mr. Simovic's outline -- that such a measure might be worth trying, and then refer the matter to conversations on an expert or technical level -

"... at the stage when, on the basis of a political agreement in principle, it becomes necessary to work out a technical variant for its implementation, including control." (ENDC/PV.158, p.17)

At such a juncture an ad hoc group of experts could be of great value for coming to grips with such problems as the kinds, grades and amounts of nuclear materials to be considered as the minimum safeguard in order to achieve the politically-determined level of security and the measure of inspection considered sufficient.

In this connexion, the United Kingdom delegation submitted a working paper as early as 1962 entitled "The Technical Possibility of International Control of Fissile Material Production" (ENDC/60), which should now be scrutinized and the ideas contained in it developed further. Such an examination could not properly be conducted at our general meetings. After scrutiny by a more technical group, the question would come back to our Committee, and I am convinced that we should then reach final agreement with greater speed and greater trust because the problem would have been reduced to manageable terms. It would also be then, and only then, that the Committee would seem to be in a position to clinch the major residual political problem, that is, how any suggested measure in its concretized form might affect the military balance. I submit that an issue such as that should never be within the competence of any sub-group; but, just as assuredly, I would say that it could not be solved by this Committee if questions of quantities and technicalities had not been placed in their right perspective by a more private and semi-technical collation of relevant facts. Let us be clear. We do not wish the working parties to have any greater leeway than that. The over-riding responsibility should always belong to the negotiating parties seated in this Conference.

I apologize for having taken so much of the Committee's time for this rather pedestrian approach to our work, but I have done so because I was afraid that we

(Mrs. Myrdal, Sweden)

might have faced an impasse on this simple matter of procedure just because it was not made clear that political decisions and technical elucidation of facts are to be kept rigidly apart.

There is one other point on which I might want to state a sine qua non in relation to the prospective use of informal working parties. It is really a kind of self-insurance against any introduction of politics into the more technical discussions: namely, that they should not be set up with the participation of only one of the major parties concerned in our disarmament negotiations. If we are to overcome, in a constructive way, the heritage of the "cold war", we must have the benefit of such factual discussions being conducted mutually, multilaterally and internationally. If that is not possible, the delegations will of course have to fall back on their individual advisers, although such isolation of them seems ineffective, to say the least.

Let me now turn to some matters of substance confronting us. We must all be contented that we have a chance, on the one hand, to proceed further with our blueprint of a general and complete disarmament treaty, and on the other hand with exploration of a number of measures labelled collateral -- that is, permissive of more immediate implementation.

As we move along in our general debate, we will certainly be looking more closely into the pregnant suggestions for collateral measures made in the opening statements here by the representatives of the United States (ENDC/PV.157, pp.10 et seq.) and the Soviet Union (*ibid.*, pp.16 et seq.), and again by the Soviet Union today, as also in the message of President Johnson transmitted to this Conference (ENDC/120). In approaching this part of our work we shall, I hope, take a very pragmatic posture vis-à-vis the proposals.

This, at least, is going to be the line of the Swedish delegation: whichever one of the collateral measures seems ripe for early implementation should be given a high priority in our deliberations. That is said in full cognizance of the fact that most of the measures now listed for discussion aim not at disarmament proper but at some effect in slowing down the armaments race, or freezing a status quo, or reducing certain risks. Any of them would in addition carry weight as builders of confidence in the world, and as such we must value them highly.

(Mrs. Myrdal, Sweden)

In connexion with the collateral measures listed, I would respectfully submit the following marginal comments for the time being.

First, there is one item on which there seems to be a close convergence of interests: that is, to have a network of observation posts established on both sides of the confrontation lines in Europe in order to give forewarnings of movements of military forces and thus also to forestall surprise attacks. When reading the fine print of the United States and the Soviet Union statements in this regard (ENDC/PV.157, pp.12, 18), we find that some political negotiations on conditions and modalities are still in abeyance. But we hope that they will be resolved and that it may soon be announced that there will be a jointly-sanctioned system of peace watchmen established in this part of the world, which is, it seems to us, psychologically ready for peace.

In the second instance, there are at hand such proposals as those of a "freeze of the number and characteristics of strategic nuclear vehicles"; of a halt to the "production of fissionable materials for weapons use" -- which, by the way, should perhaps read "fissionable and fusionable materials" -- I am now referring to a few points listed in President Johnson's message (ENDC/120, p.2) -- of actual physical "destruction of nuclear delivery vehicles" as proposed specifically hitherto by the United Kingdom (ENDC/PV.157, p.23); and of a "reduction of the total numbers of the armed forces of States" (supra, p. 7), to quote one from the long list suggested by the Soviet Union.

In this category of unconnected and thus truly "partial" measures, I submit that we should move forward following a very simple pragmatic guide-line: that is, trying to reach agreement first on whatever is easiest to achieve. If those measures which do not require much of a control machinery are more easily realizable -- for instance, the physical destruction of some weapons -- let us by all means make a start with them. Even if the weapons sacrificed to begin with this year were only those which had become obsolete to a highly-industrialized and highly-militarized nation, it would at least remove some danger that such weapons might become available for possible use in local wars. It would, at the same time, provide the world with the psychologically very impressive sight of a bonfire, preferably an international, multilateral bonfire, where the spectacle of actual destruction of weapons would engender confidence. The pragmatic view compels us to say that what is easiest to agree on should be tried first.

(Mrs. Myrdal, Sweden)

But this is, of course, not the main objective of our work here, as there is little of definite disarmament contained in these suggestions. For the sake of our public relations we should, nevertheless, try to register agreements on them, and do so soon.

In a third and special category I would place the question of non-dissemination of nuclear weapons and the related one of nuclear-free zones, as those problems are much more directly of concern to a great number of States. The Swedish delegation has noted that, in the lists presented by the major nuclear Powers on 21 January, somewhat different approaches are now utilized, the United States saying that nuclear weapons should "not be transferred into the national control of States which do not now control them" (ENDC/PV.157, p.12), while the Soviet Union version has the two-fold theme: (a) that "it is the duty of all States to do everything in their power to avert the threat of the further dissemination of nuclear weapons" (*ibid*, p.18); and (b) also recommending "the creation of denuclearized zones in various parts of the world" (*ibid*, p.17). What the present nuclear Powers would want to do in order to close the possibilities of further transfers of such weapons is one thing, and what the non-nuclear Powers would undertake in this matter is clearly a different one.

The representative of Canada referred on 23 January both to the proposals for establishing nuclear-free zones (ENDC/PV.158, p.14) and to the so-called Irish plan for achieving non-dissemination of nuclear weapons (A/RES/1665 (XVI)) (ENDC/PV.158, p.13), which envisaged universal agreement with parallel commitments by nuclear and non-nuclear Powers alike. As is well known, the Swedish Government considers the problem of preventing the further spread of nuclear weapons to be of the greatest significance. That is one of the reasons why it greeted the partial test ban agreement with such great satisfaction, and why it considers an extension of that agreement to cover all tests to be most desirable.

With regard to methods for curbing the dissemination of nuclear weapons, the Swedish Government feels that special attention ought to be given to the approach inherent in the so-called Undén plan, which led up to General Assembly resolution 1664 (XVI) and which envisages the creation of nuclear-free zones by means of agreements concluded between States within a certain region. It is foreseen that,

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in connexion with such regional denuclearization agreements, the participating States could formulate the conditions they want to see fulfilled for adherence to the nuclear-free zones. The prerequisites claimed might inter alia refer to obligations by the nuclear Powers to make certain concessions on their part -- for instance, in the form of compensating measures such as an undertaking to stop all nuclear tests or to carry out other measures in the disarmament field. Whereas it must be left to the States contemplating the creation of nuclear-free zones to determine all questions relating to the conclusion of the agreements and to the conditions attached thereto, it would seem worth while for our Committee to study certain general aspects and rules which would be applicable to such zones.

Parenthetically I would say also that my delegation might in the forthcoming weeks revert to the proposals referring to the need to deal peacefully with territorial disputes, raised in Chairman Khrushchev's New Year message and further detailed in President Johnson's statement to this Conference (ENDC/120). The many questions related to this problem would open a new field for this Committee, as it is neither an ad hoc collateral measure nor to be referred to the all-embracing treaty on general and complete disarmament.

What I have been saying in relation to our agenda items so far closely relates to one problem which has always particularly interested my delegation: namely, the problem of control. We have always been convinced, on the one hand, that there must be controls when disarmament occurs -- yes, that international verification of disarmament measures is essential in order to secure full, mutual and world-wide confidence. On the other hand, we have always held, and often reiterated, that control measures should not be conceived in abstracto but should be very carefully and concretely ~~apportioned~~ apportioned so that they can be made as inexpensive as possible, in terms of money and manpower, and also as unobtrusive as possible. Only in this way can they achieve a maximum of acceptability. Unless they are technically and politically acceptable, suggested methods of control are, of course, of nil value. We have even gone so far as to express a desire to utilize, as a prelude to an agreement on general and complete disarmament, the opportunity of implementing a fair number of collateral measures, with their

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integrated control measures, for the subsidiary purpose of having a kind of practice period to see how true disarmament controls are to be exercised.

Against that background, may I now first congratulate ourselves on how much more manageable this problem of control has become under the present approach to our work: that is, when a series of collateral measures for reduction of armaments or for halting the upward spiral of the armaments race, independent or fairly independent from each other, is to be discussed alongside our main assignment, which is and remains imperatively to prepare a draft treaty in very firm terms for general and complete disarmament -- because in this way it becomes self-evident that control measures have to be tailor-made specifically for each one of the measures pending. By following this approach we shall have occasion to test a much greater variety of control measures than if we were only discussing a preconceived scheme of "verification", in the singular, for "disarmament" per se. We can then perceive verification measures that might stretch from what is practically an absence of international control, as, for instance, in the case of the partial test ban treaty (ENDC/100/Rev.1), to some quite rigidly applied system of international inspection in some other specific case.

In adopting this perspective of dealing with control measures not in toto but in specific circumstances, the Swedish delegation has been particularly gratified to find such increasing attention being given by the great Powers to the possibilities of freezing or even reducing budgetary allocations for military expenditures (ENDC/PV.157, pp.11, 13, 14). In the fairly long list of suggestions made at our meetings, that is one of the few points on which the views of the representatives from East and West actually converge; how closely, is, of course, yet difficult to see. It is our contention that the question of verification, if related to suggestions of reductions of military expenditure, opens an interesting field for co-operative study without any necessity to institutionalize a system of control. It has not been proposed -- at least not at this stage, when such reductions might well depend not on a treaty text but on unilateral decisions, although stimulated by "mutual examples" -- that these reductions should be the object of any rigid international control, any "inspection in loco" or any recourse to "sanctions". But in order that the examples should have an effect of

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emulation --- yes, in order to breed international confidence -- the reductions instituted should of course be ascertainable by the international community. Thus we obtain an opportunity to study methods of indirect verification, just by compiling, comparing and analyzing statistics.

I venture to suggest that for the conclusion of an eventual agreement on such measures of "economic disarmament", or even just for measuring the economic effect of any more considerable reduction of armaments, we can do valuable preparatory work already now when such reductions in military expenditure are announced. One of the most promising leads for the whole question of indirect, inoffensive control consists simply of increasing the internationally-available knowledge about changes in economic allocations for military purposes -- without any hint of interference with the dispositions within each nation. On this point, and particularly on the problem of international comparability, we might have more to say at a later stage, as it seems to us very important and interesting.

Finally, one word on our discussion of general and complete disarmament. Rather little has so far been said on this major assignment of ours during the meetings of this session. I believe that we need something of a new take-off for this debate in order to give it more vigour. More specifically, I wonder if I am right in expecting that we shall get from the United States and the Soviet Union delegations respectively, a review of such modifications of their draft treaties as might be warranted by the very important new element introduced by Mr. Gromyko's proposal that what for short we call the "nuclear umbrella" should provide a kind of ultimate guarantee of deterrence until the end of the last stage of the disarmament process (A/PV.1208, provisional, p.71).

My main purpose in speaking today has been to testify to the lively interest which the Swedish delegation will take in the ensuing work of this Conference. We tenaciously continue to be ready to co-operate in any possible way towards the achievement of results in the search for disarmament, and we do find it encouraging that this session starts under such fairly promising auspices. But promises do not continue to be promising if they long remain unfulfilled.

Mr. CAVALLETTI (Italy) (translation from French): Two speakers have spoken before me this morning, the Soviet Union representative and the representative of Sweden. I cordially welcome the return to this Conference of Mrs. Myrdal, who has once again brought to our work the valuable contribution of her experience and intellect. I think we are all in her debt for what she has said and the ideas she has advanced.

The message delivered by Mr. Tsarapkin this morning is undoubtedly very important and will have to be studied with the greatest care. Such study seems to me particularly necessary in order to decide which proposals contained in the memorandum (ENDC/123) are genuinely new, and whether proposals already familiar to us and on which the Western delegations have already expressed their views are now being submitted to the Committee with new aspects and new prospects in accordance with the improvement in the international situation. I sincerely hope and trust that this is the case, despite Mr. Tsarapkin's repetition of certain concepts and ideas to which the Western objections are well known. Furthermore, Mr. Tsarapkin, taking up a thought expressed by Mr. Thomas (ENDC/PV.157, p.23), spoke to us of his desire to begin disarmament with positive steps and the physical destruction of certain weapons (supra, p.15). That is an idea which has naturally met with the wholehearted approval and support of the Italian delegation, subject of course to its compatibility with the fundamental principles of disarmament.

In any case, given the scope and importance of the Soviet document, it will come as no surprise if I allow myself to postpone to a later meeting my observations on the substance of the problems dealt with in the document after I have had an opportunity to read the record carefully. But I should like to express immediately my delegation's interest in Mr. Tsarapkin's statement, and to emphasize that the spirit which appears to prompt the Soviet delegation's initiative, and its desire to speed up the Committee's work, naturally have my delegation's full sympathy.

I should now like to turn to the purpose of my statement today. I have asked for the floor because the Italian delegation, having followed with close attention the first part of our general discussion, wishes at this juncture to make some remarks to the Committee with the object of co-operating with other delegations and setting our negotiations on the right track.

(Mr. Cavalletti, Italy)

First of all, like Mrs. Myrdal, I note with satisfaction that the discussion has already brought out some unanimity of view about the change in the international situation and the Committee's improved chances of success. This fact has been mentioned by all the delegations and emphasized by the international press, and this in itself constitutes a new and positive psychological factor of appreciable value.

Our discussion has centred as much on working methods as on matters of substance, and a number of delegations have expressed their views and put forward proposals in regard to both. Some measure of unanimity also appears to be emerging in regard to working methods. It appears to me that we are all agreed on the need for a gradual, step-by-step approach in seeking to arrive at the widest possible agreements, while not neglecting limited agreements. Further, in regard to methods of work, some delegations have asked for technical studies while others have maintained that political decisions of principle must first be taken. I do not think the choice between the two can be made a priori. Sometimes political decisions of principle are required as a first step; at other times they cannot be taken until thorough technical knowledge has been acquired. In my opinion either system can be followed according to the subject and the circumstances.

Passing to the substance of the problem, I notice that the general discussion has given rise to a very considerable number of proposals, some of which are already known while others are quite new. As it is not possible to do everything at once, we must now establish some working rules and fix an order of priority.

In my opinion, the criterion which must guide us is obvious. The Committee should first apply itself to all those matters on which we can expect agreement, or the difficulties of which are not insurmountable. To insist upon the immediate discussion of proposals which we know from the outset to be unacceptable to the other side, or which still involve serious disagreement, would not only be sterile but might spoil the harmonious atmosphere which prevails among us. The United Kingdom representative stated on 21 January:

"Indeed, we shall always look for fresh ideas in this forum from wherever they may come ..." (ENDC/PV.157, p.21)

At the same meeting the Italian delegation expressed itself in similar terms, and I think that we are all agreed on this point. But we have to be guided by considerations of expediency and to devise effective tactics against our common enemy which is failure, postponing until later major issues that will be settled if the situation continues to improve.

(Mr. Cavalletti, Italy)

In its last statement (ENDC/PV.157, pp.26 et seq.) the Italian delegation did not comment in detail on President Johnson's message to the Conference (ENDC/120), though it immediately expressed keen appreciation for this initiative, which Mr. Thomas described as bold and imaginative (ENDC/PV.157, p.23).

The Italian delegation would now like to give closer study to this document, which fully accords with the ideas I myself expressed on 21 January. As a first point, President Johnson proposes that we discuss means of prohibiting the use or threat of force in territorial issues. That is a matter which belongs quite appropriately to a system of collateral measures aimed at reducing international tension.

Concerning the ideas put forward by President Johnson, I should like to remind the Committee of what I said at our meeting on 22 August 1963:

"... we are and always have been opposed ... to any direct or indirect aggression, to any material or verbal threat and to any subversive or intolerant action against freedom and the free and independent life of nations. We should like to eliminate these threats everywhere, in both hemispheres, in all continents, not only in Europe ..." (ENDC/PV.154, p. 8)

We therefore hope that the proposals contained in the first point of President Johnson's message may soon be studied thoroughly and find a tangible application.

Mr. Tsarapkin told us this morning that the Soviet delegation was ready to spell out in greater detail the proposals made by Mr. Khrushchev on 31 December (supra, p.). That is a very encouraging declaration, particularly as the principal problems relating to the peaceful solution of territorial disputes, namely the problems of the organization of peace and the creation of an international peace force, have for long been on this Conference's agenda.

The second point in the United States document invites us to "... agree to explore a verified freeze of the number and characteristics of strategic nuclear offensive and defensive vehicles" (ENDC/120, p. 2). I think nobody can fail to discern the importance and positive character of this entirely new proposal, concerning which I should like to make the following points:

(Mr. Cavalletti, Italy)

A. The freezing of armaments is an essential provision of any agreement on disarmament. In order to achieve disarmament, the first step must be to put a stop to the armaments race. That is self-evident. Agreement on the United States proposal is a necessary condition of any real progress in the disarmament of strategic nuclear delivery vehicles, which are a very important element in the present organization of defence. The destruction of such vehicles without such a preliminary freeze would have no practical value since it would obviously be possible to rebuild on the one hand what had been destroyed on the other.

B. Without being an expert, I think that verification of an agreement on the freezing of strategic nuclear delivery vehicles would be relatively simple, and that it could also provide useful experience for extending the control that would be necessary if agreement were reached on the partial or total elimination of these vehicles.

C. The freezing of strategic nuclear delivery vehicles would permit of considerable budgetary savings. On 24 January the Nigerian representative drew attention to the problem of military expenditures, which he described as "immoral" and "almost criminal folly in a world ravaged by hunger, disease and want..." (ENDC/PV.159, p. 13). In my opinion, an immediate freeze of the production of strategic nuclear delivery vehicles, which are, I believe, the most costly weapons in the world, would be a very good start in solving the problems of which Mr. Cbi reminded us.

The third point in the United States proposal concerns the "cut-off" and its verification. We have often spoken of this measure in the past and I do not wish to repeat myself. I would only say that the problem appears in a new light after the example given in the matter by the United States Government. I hope that this example will provide encouragement for the conclusion of a real treaty to halt all production of fissile materials for military purposes.

The fourth point of President Johnson's message deals with the creation of a system of observation posts, on which I expatiated at some length during my last statement. This is part of the series of measures which the Italian delegation regards as highly desirable in order to diminish general mistrust. During our discussions some Eastern delegations have established a link between the acceptance of observation posts and other delicate disarmament measures directly affecting the existing balance. I hope that this link, which would make it impossible to establish

(Mr. Cavalletti, Italy)

observation posts, is not a sine qua non, and that our colleagues from the East will reconsider their position. Indeed, the establishment of observation posts would have some value per se independently of other possible disarmament measures. It has a precise and clear purpose unconnected with agreements in other spheres. The aim of having observation posts is to remove fear on both sides and to restore mutual confidence, which as you know the Italian delegation regards as one of our Conference's essential tasks.

The fifth point of the United States document relates to stopping "the spread of nuclear weapons to nations not now controlling them", in connexion with which three proposals are made under paragraphs (A), (B) and (C). All these proposals are most valuable and meet with our support. I should like, however, to dwell particularly on the first one, with which we are especially concerned, and which provides that nuclear weapons should not be transferred to the national control of States which do not now control them.

In connexion with this important proposal, the delegations of certain Eastern countries have already seen fit to express some doubts and to make remarks -- which I would take the liberty of describing as hasty -- about the studies now under way on the possible establishment of a multilateral force by certain NATO countries, including Italy. In order to clarify the Italian Government's intentions on this project, I should like to quote from the statement made by the Italian Prime Minister, Mr. Moro, in the Chamber of Deputies on 12 December 1963. He said:

"The negotiations on a multilateral force in which the Italian Government is participating have a threefold aim: to guarantee ever greater security for our country, to ensure collective control of nuclear weapons in the spirit of the Moscow Treaty, and to avoid the risks of the proliferation and spread of nuclear weapons."

In the Italian Government's opinion, a multilateral force would not only lack the characteristics criticized by certain Eastern delegations, but would constitute a guarantee that nuclear weapons would not spread. One of the specific reasons for which the possibility of establishing a multilateral force is being studied is to exclude other national channels of access to atomic weapons, which would inevitably lead to dissemination. I repeat that studies are under way, but our aims, which I have just stated, are immutable and clear; they will be confirmed by the development of these studies.

(Mr. Cavalletti, Italy)

Again in connexion with the establishment of a multilateral force, some Eastern delegations have levelled criticisms against the Federal Republic of Germany. I should like to remind you once again that the Federal Republic of Germany is the only country which has entered into a formal legal pledge not to possess any atomic weapons. Moreover, it is unjust to suspect the Federal Republic of Germany of fostering dangerous territorial aspirations when, having renounced the use of force, its sole aim is to apply the principle of self-determination, which is a fundamental principle of the United Nations Charter.

The proposals contained in President Johnson's message, which I have just analysed and which represent a practical programme of work for our Conference, are certainly not exhaustive. All the Western delegations are doubtless prepared to include a number of other proposals in the agenda of the Conference.

Several delegations have mentioned the limitation and reduction of military budgets, and Mr. Tsarapkin did so only this morning. The Italian delegation considers that the reduction of military expenditure could be most important in itself, and could have beneficial effects in every sector, and I might even say on the economies of every country. But State budgets are very complicated and mysterious documents, even for experts. In order to reach agreements on the question, it is essential to make sure that limitations or reductions of declared expenses are not only apparent but actually correspond to a real reduction of the military effort. It therefore appears to me essential first to undertake detailed studies and to draw comparisons between different budgets by means of appropriate research.

In this connexion, I should like to point out that, in the matter of budgetary reductions as in other matters, although we welcome the giving of reciprocal examples with enthusiasm, we would appreciate even more real international agreements such as the one on nuclear tests signed at Moscow, to which numerous other countries have acceded. We should like the disarmament process to be really irreversible and to be based on reciprocal, comprehensive and multilateral legal obligations.

With regard to denuclearized zones, our Committee has already dealt with this subject last year, although without going into much detail, and particularly in connexion with denuclearized zones in Latin America and in Africa. Here I should like to take up again an idea which was put forward by Mr. Burns on 23 January. The Canadian representative expressed himself as follows:

(Mr. Cavalletti, Italy)

"In our view the most promising approach would be to examine the conditions which should exist and the criteria which should be applied in working out agreements in nuclear-free zones in various parts of the world".

(ENDC/PV.158, p.14)

This seems to me to be wise. At earlier sessions we have already referred to certain principles, in particular the principle that the establishment of zones should, inter alia, conform to the fundamental principles of disarmament and should not alter the existing military balance. The subsequent drawing-up and establishment of such general principles might facilitate the implementation of these plans, which are especially dear to certain delegations of non-aligned countries participating in this Conference.

Until now I have referred to collateral disarmament measures because I think we are all agreed that this is the sector in which we should try to obtain quick and positive results. Nevertheless, my delegation, like others which have preceded me in the discussion, certainly has no intention of minimizing the importance of a treaty on general and complete disarmament. On the contrary, general and complete disarmament is still our goal, and there is complete unanimity in the Committee on this matter, as is natural.

In this connexion I should like to point out that in 1962 we began to prepare certain texts which were agreed or partly agreed. Last year we did not resume our efforts in this direction. In my opinion this is a task to which we should return. Of course, we have found that the preparation of an agreed text becomes more and more difficult as generalizations are left behind. Nevertheless, I think it would be wise for the Committee to embark once again upon this task, perhaps with the help of drafting committees. I think it would be useful to agree on a joint text, even if it reflects little agreement and much disagreement. Such a document would still be valuable, for it would represent a conclusion to discussions which would otherwise have been wasted. To my mind, it is better to have a text containing many brackets and double brackets than a pile of verbatim records.

I have now concluded the remarks which I wished to make to the Committee today. I hope that the two co-Chairmen, having taken into account everything that has been said here, and any statements that may be made later by other delegations, will be able to agree on proposing for this session of the Conference a well-organized, clear agenda relating to the issues which offer the greatest possibility of agreement.

Mr. FOSTER (United States): Today, the hour being somewhat late, I shall limit myself to making a few brief comments.

First, I wish to thank all of you who have paid tribute to President Kennedy in your remarks here. I have reported those comments to Washington and, on behalf of the Kennedy family and my Government, I wish to express their appreciation to you.

I should also like to welcome the representative of the United Arab Republic, who had not arrived when I last spoke, and to express our pleasure at the presence here today of Mrs. Myrdal of Sweden.

My delegation listened with great interest to the statement by the Soviet representative. It contains an elaboration of many points, some of which we have heard before and on which we have expressed our views. We shall, however, in due course wish to comment further on several points he made. I noted also what appeared to be acceptance -- at least, in principle -- of the United States suggested approach to a first step towards physical destruction of armaments (supra, p.15).

As the Committee is aware, the United States has suggested informally the exploration of the possibility of mutual destruction of certain bombers by the United States and the Soviet Union. We shall wish to pursue this in detail in further discussions. We shall also wish to develop further the five points which were made in President Johnson's message to this Conference. Each of those points would help to reduce tensions and reduce the risk of war. Each would help to open further the path to disarmament.

I have noted with deep interest the helpful comments of the Swedish representative. To use her expression, we shall make her suggestions an important part of our "homework". I am sure the Committee will wish to consider carefully those suggestions for expediting its work.

Finally, I welcome the comments of the representative of Italy. My delegation will also give close attention to his remarks. In particular, in future meetings we will discuss United States policy against the proliferation of national nuclear forces, and the consistency of this policy with the proposed multilateral force.

In conclusion, let me express my pleasure that our meetings have begun in such a good atmosphere. This, indeed, seems to me to augur well for our progress.

The Conference decided to issue the following communiqué

"The Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament today held its 160th plenary meeting in the Palais des Nations, Geneva, under the Chairmanship of H.E. Ambassador R.K. Nehru, representative of India.

"Statements were made by the representatives of the Soviet Union, Sweden, Italy and the United States.

"The delegation of the Soviet Union tabled a memorandum of the Government of the USSR on Measures for slowing down the armaments race and relaxing international tension.^{1/}

"The next meeting of the Conference will be held on Thursday, 30 January 1964, at 10.30 a.m."

The meeting rose at 12.25 p.m.